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Mixing Methods in Innovation Research: Studying 
the Process-Culture-Link in Innovation Management 
Jens O. Meissner & Martin Sprenger  
Abstract: »Methodenmix in der Innovationsforschung: Eine Analyse des Zu-
sammenhangs zwischen Innovationsprozessen und Unternehmenskultur«. Two 
trends in innovation management have influenced the basic idea of this paper. 
The first trend shows increased attempts by managers to utilize linear innova-
tion processes derived from literature and from practice. The second trend is an 
increasing acceptance of the dynamics created in an “innovation culture,” as 
being one of the key drivers of innovation. Both approaches partially contrast 
each other. Researching the literature in more detail, we found that studies ex-
plaining the link between innovation culture and innovation project manage-
ment are rare. Indeed there is a study by Shona BROWN and Kathleen EIS-
ENHARDT (1995) which gives an excellent overview of innovation 
management research, but again the issue of “culture” was lacking. This miss-
ing link between innovation process design and innovation culture at the firm-
level provides the theoretical framework of this paper. Behind the scenes of 
innovation management studies, we realized a methodological gap existed be-
tween the research of innovation cultures and their impact upon an organiza-
tion’s innovation processes. Thus, we applied a methodological mix of prob-
lem-centered interviews, structural analyses, and context analyses to study the 
phenomenon. We conducted an interview-based single case study in a Swiss 
telecommunications company. From these methodologies we created a themed 
landscape comprising relational topics of the innovation dynamics within an 
innovation project in the company (one year duration) and briefly described 
each topic. The main finding in our study is the dynamic role-model that inno-
vation managers in large service firms have to apply to succeed in their innova-
tion management work. Thus, our methodological mix proved to be helpful, 
although some weaknesses remain to be solved in the future. 
Keywords: words: innovation dynamics; process-culture-link; multi-method 
research. 
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1. Introduction 
Two trends in innovation management influenced the basic idea of this paper. 
First, the increasing attempts by managers to design linear innovation man-
agement processes that can be derived from literature and practice. Second, the 
increasing acceptance of the dynamics of the innovation culture, as key drivers 
of innovation influenced this paper. Both approaches partially contrast each 
other. In the following section, these two trends are presented. 
The first approach supposes that innovation processes can be structured in a 
more or less rigid manner. Exponents of this stream are for example the Cooper 
Stage-Gate-Model (see COOPER, 1998), the Funnel Model (e.g. TERWIESCH 
& ULRICH, 2009), or the Open Innovation Process Model (CHESBROUGH, 
2003). We consider that these concepts are barely sufficient for dealing with 
innovation dynamics (and sources) that cannot be regulated by a process 
model. This is not unusual within irregular business circumstances, or when 
explaining unpredictable social dynamics. However, in organizational innova-
tion, irregularity is a typical variable. 
The second approach is based on cultural concepts. Exponents of this stream 
are for example the Schein Culture Model (see SCHEIN, 1992), the Sackmann 
Iceberg Model (SACKMANN, 1991), the Cultural Core Model (SACKMANN, 
2002), or the Want Corporate Culture Hierarchy (see WANT, 2003). These 
models explain the relevance of implicit, more or less hidden, or invisible dy-
namics of innovation within social structures and organizations. It has been 
widely confirmed in theory and practice that companies can hardly access the 
tacit dimension of an innovation culture (e.g. NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, 
1995). Neither can it be systematically assessed and completely explained by 
management initiatives alone. Even so, the hidden beliefs and attitudes about 
innovation and innovativeness massively influence the social processing of 
innovation projects. 
The topic of product development has been examined by Shona BROWN 
and Kathleen EISENHARDT (1995). According to them, the empirical litera-
ture about product development can be organized into three categories. The 
first of these categories is product development as a rational plan. According 
to this perspective, a product that is well-planned, implemented, and appropri-
ately supported will be a success, on condition that the product has market 
place advantages, is placed in an attractive market, and is well executed 
through excellent internal organization. Selected studies from this category are 
e.g. Robert G. COOPER and Elko J. KLEINSCHMIDT (1987), or Billie J. 
ZIRGER and Modesto A. MAIDIQUE (1990). The second category of research 
is product development as a communication web. According to this category, 
external communications (with suppliers and customers) is critical to success-
ful product development. Successful product development teams include gate-
keepers, who encourage team communication outside of their groups, and 
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powerful project managers who communicate externally to ensure resources for 
the group. Internal communication improves the development-team’s perform-
ance. Cross-functional teams that structure their internal communication 
around concrete tasks, new routines, and well articulated job descriptions, have 
for example, been associated with improved internal communication and suc-
cessful products. Selected studies of this category are e.g. Debora Gladstein 
ANCONA and David CALDWELL (1990) or Deborah DOUGHERTY (1992). 
The third category is called the disciplined problem solving perspective. Ac-
cording to this perspective, successful product development involves relatively 
autonomous problem solving performed by cross-functional teams with a high 
degree of communication, and the organization of work according to the de-
mands of the development task. An extensive supplier network coupled with 
overlapping product development phases, communication, and cross-functional 
groups improve the performance of development teams. This perspective also 
highlights the role of project leaders and senior management. There is an em-
phasis on both project and senior management; on the one hand, to provide a 
vision or discipline to the development efforts and, on the other hand, to pro-
vide autonomy to the teams. Examples of studies of this category are James P. 
WOMACK, Daniel T. JONES and Daniel ROOS (1990), or Kim B. CLARK 
and Takahiro FUJIMOTO (1991). 
Figure 1 developed an integrative model which summarizes the key findings 
within the literature Shona BROWN and Kathleen EISENHARDT (1995). The 
key to developing such an integrative model was the observation that the cate-
gories have complementary theoretical approaches. The organizing idea behind 
the model was that there are multiple players, whose actions influence product 
performance. Specifically, BROWN and EISENHARDT argue that the project 
team, the leader, senior management, and suppliers, all affect process perform-
ance (e.g. speed and productivity of product development); the project leader, 
customers, and senior management affect product effectiveness (i.e., the fit of 
the product with firm competencies and market needs), and the combination of 
an efficient process, effective product, and a munificent market enhanced the 
financial success of the product (i.e. revenue, profitability, and market share).  
In addition to the literature covering product development, our case was de-
rived from a number of studies that focus on entrepreneurship, which helped us 
understand the challenges of start-ups during the development of innovation 
management capabilities. This branch of research assumes that entrepreneurs 
act as “opportunity takers” (SARASVATHY, DEW, VELAMURI & 
VENKATARAMAN, 2003). Sources of opportunities are structured along the 
locus of change, such as supply sources, ways and techniques of organization, 
and characteristics of products and markets (SHANE & ECKARDT, 2006, 
p.170). Other studies in the literature link the ability to take opportunity to 
personality traits. They suggest that people with a high tolerance for ambiguity, 
willingness to take risks, and a need for achievement become entrepreneurs 
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(e.g. KHILSTROM & LAFFONT, 1979; WIKLUND, PATZELT & SHEP-
HERD, 2009) The strongest critique against this stream of literature focusing 
on the start-up processes only of young firms up to ten years in age. In these 
companies, the picture of the innovator as an opportunity taker might be ade-
quate for conceptualizing a very important source of innovation. But for larger 
companies, there will definitely be other drivers which are missing from this 
literature stream. Additionally, large parts of this stream rely on quantitative 
data, which is not adequate for the study of cultural phenomena. 
Figure 1: Factors Affecting the Success of Product-Development Projects 
(BROWN & EISENHARDT, 1995)1 
 
 
The issue that seems to be generally missing in the literature is the description 
of the link between innovation culture and the innovation process. Classical 
innovation management tends to assume that ideas can be more or less easily 
generated (e.g. with idea management), or that they can be handled like a pro-
duction process (e.g. by stage gate processing). This is, in large part, a positiv-
istic and somehow dehumanized view of innovation management. Important 
questions regarding a company’s corporate culture remain unanswered. For 
example, how and where did the idea originate, what role do individuals or 
                                                             
1  Capital letters and thickened lines indicate robust findings. 
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groups of people play, and how will the power structure of the enterprise be 
decided? 
Our primary research question focuses on how basic assumptions of team 
members occur in consciously managed organizational innovation activities, 
and how they influence the effectiveness of the innovation process. Our early 
investigations failed to find any appropriate mixture of methodologies for con-
ducting innovation management research involving the complex interplay 
between the innovation culture and the innovation process. This missing link is 
the starting point for our investigations in this paper. 
In order to answer the research question described above, we specified a 
multi-method research design and analyzed the development process of a new 
product of the telecommunications enterprise “TELE” in a single case study. In 
the case, we investigated the individual innovation dynamics as well as their 
impact on group dynamics and the resulting impact on the new product. Of 
special interest to our study were the interaction of innovation behavior and the 
corporate culture of the firm. In the literature review, we identified several 
studies where scholars accepted the invitation “to step outside the hegemony of 
[the] ‘normal paradigm’ and to consider alternative paradigmatic positions” 
(GRANT & PERREN, 2002, p.202). We contribute to this by taking the para-
digms of general systems theory (LUHMANN, 2000) and systemic social 
constructionism (GERGEN, 1985) into account. Thus, this case study basically 
interprets innovation from a constructivist perspective (BERGER & LUCK-
MANN, 1967; BAECKER, 2003; ADERHOLD & JOHN, 2005; MEISSNER, 
WOLF & WIMMER, 2009), which focuses on the social dynamics in innova-
tion processes, and their impact. 
2. Methodology  
We have chosen a qualitative approach which focuses on “building a complex, 
holistic picture reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a 
natural setting” (CRESWELL, 1994, p.2). Qualitative study focuses on mean-
ings as they relate in context. Yvonne LINCOLN and Egon GUBA (1985) 
referred to the qualitative approach as a post-positivist naturalistic inquiry 
method of inquiry (ANTONAKIS et al., 2004). 
The present study was applied as a single case study. Robert K. YIN (2003) 
maintains that a case study is a research design “that investigates a contempo-
rary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p.40). YIN also 
emphasizes the importance of having “multiple source[s] of evidence” to get a 
broad comprehension of the observed phenomenon. Thus, in this in-depth case 
study, the researchers have chosen different methodological approaches for the 
different phases of the project. Figure 2 shows the research framework in de-
tail, comprising elements of contextual and cultural analysis.  
 185
Figure 2: Research Framework 
 
 
Due to our epistemological perspective we decided to use a multi-method re-
search design that would cover contextual, procedural and cultural aspects 
within the case study. By this design, we should be able to identify critical 
interdependencies and communication patterns that give relevant insights into 
the relationship between innovation dynamics and the corporate culture. 
At the beginning of the project a context analysis was done. This was 
achieved by means of secondary research (document and literature studies) 
focusing on industrial characteristics. Additionally, the context analysis was 
extended to the company’s internal context i.e. the situational circumstances. 
For this, we studied annual reports and several internal documents provided by 
the innovation project manager who served as gate keeper for the study. As a 
result, we got a detailed description about the characteristics of the industry, a 
detailed impression of the organization, as well as an idea of where and how 
environment and organization are bound together. 
The empirical data was collected in two waves. In the first wave we chose 
the technique of the “problem-centered interview” (WITZEL, 1982, 2000) as a 
method to access the narrated experiences of the participants. The problem-
centered interview is largely a narrative interview, depending upon the strict-
ness of the methodology. Whereas the problem-centered interview focuses on 
generating meaningful sequences, the narrative interview demands that the 
researcher reduces his own influence to a minimum. To this end, the inter-
viewer can use a variety of interventions during the interview by, for example, 
asking reflective questions. Nevertheless, the problem-centered interview is 
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basically concerned with generating narrative parts, as well as exact descrip-
tions or ideological stances towards the problem. The researchers began by 
asking the interviewees to tell them how they personally experienced the pro-
ject: in other words, they asked them for their own personal story. This estab-
lished a comfortable atmosphere for the interviewees to tell the researchers 
their side of the story; one without any adverse consequences for them profes-
sionally. The aim was to gain verbalized experiences, which provide valuable 
clues on how the interviewee sees and constructs his world, thus revealing his 
or her “theories-in-use.” Afterwards, the interview was fully transcribed so that 
the researcher could focus on the meaning of the spoken words. 
Throughout the analysis of the first wave, the researcher was guided by the 
following questions: What are the key issues in the innovation process and how 
is the process scheduled? Of course, during the course of the interview, one 
will discover aspects arising with which one is very familiar. The effect of this 
discovery on the research has to be acknowledged in order that he or she can 
move beyond looking at the other, towards looking at the situation through 
interviewee’s eyes, i.e. from their perspective. One of the characteristics of this 
method is that there are no pre-formulated categories which can be used by the 
analyzer in order to process the interview. As a result, we got a list of extracted 
theoretical content through quotes from the interview material, as well as a 
process description. The analysis was conducted between August 2008 and 
April 2009.  
In the second phase, a “structuring technique” method was applied (GEISE, 
2006). This method specifies a means of knowledge acquisition, where terms 
are grouped together, according to the relationship of these terms to others that 
have already been collected from the researched individuals (HACKEL & 
KLEBL, 2008). With this approach, subjective theories were clarified visually, 
enabling the (subjective) structure of the theory to be rearranged. As a result we 
were able to obtain the relevant content (terms, statements, etc.) and to deduce 
the relationships between them. The guidelines for using this technique suggest 
the following stages be followed. To assist researchers wishing to use this 
technique, a brief resume of the guidelines now provided. To depict the struc-
ture, cards are used on which the contents (terms, statements, etc.) of the theory 
should be represented. The guideline also defines how the cards are related 
together in a formal relationship. To indicate the character of a relationship, 
corresponding symbols are used (e.g. “=” means “equivalent to another con-
cept”). Arrows could make dependencies and cause-effect relationships much 
clearer. This procedure makes it possible to create visible relationships between 
unique terms. The number of terms is limited to avoid being overloaded with 
categorizations. For our research the terms were selected by the research group, 
based on the interview results from the first wave. Limitating the number of 
terms is also potentially disadvantageous and to compensate for this circum-
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stance we used a “carte blanche,” which could be used to complete important 
details. 
The interviewee groups were presented with eleven terms written down on 
cards, which had been identified in the problem-centered interviews as central 
topics. The respondents reassembled the terms relationally. 
The relationships were clarified with the help of symbols. As a second task, 
we presented the interviewees with eleven statements, which they had to accept 
or to reject. The statements were based on the eleven terms. For example, we 
confronted the interviewees in a first step with the term “competition.” This 
was followed by the statement, “the competition forces us to be innovative.” As 
a final task, the interviewees had to place the statement into an ordinal scale. 
Afterwards, the conversation was also fully transcribed and the structure was 
recorded photographically.  
Table 1: Trigger Terms and Statements Used Within the Structuring Technique 
Trigger Terms Statements 
External partners External partners are important for ... 
Cross-functional participation For an optimal product development we should integrate as many business sections as possible. 
Internal knowledge manage-
ment 
Often we do not use our internal knowledge in the com-
pany in an optimal way. 
The company’s autonomy We are innovative because we want to increase our autonomy from the mother company. 
Internal resistance I use the customer need as argument when I am con-fronted with internal resistance against the new product. 
Working in small teams We unfold innovations in small teams in which we are very productive. 
Product vision It is important to believe in ideas with future potential, although not anyone in the company would agree to this. 
Internal rules and structures We have many rules and structures which tend to disturb our innovation process. 
Support of (top) management Without support of (top) management, innovations do not have a chance in our company. 
Competition of providers The competition forces us to be innovative. 
Identification with the new 
product 
Someone from us has to see a new product as his own 
baby. 
Carte blanche Carte blanche 
 
For the analysis of the second wave we were guided by the questions: “what 
are the key issues within the structure,” and “which aspects are more/less im-
portant”? As a result, we extracted more detailed theoretical content. Based on 
the list, we developed a process landscape which shows key issues and rela-
tionships between them. This occurred between July and August 2009. Thus, 
the whole process of data gathering and analysis took over a year to complete. 
The goal of the analysis was to find out the relevant statements, which could 
then give advice on the innovation process of the TELE.  
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The conduct of the study was conducted on the classic quality criteria of va-
lidity, reliability, and objectivity (PETRUCCI & WIRTZ, 2007). Objectivity – 
in this research understood as the convergence of intersubjectivity – was en-
sured by the fact that results were always discussed within the research team. 
During the whole analysis process, a group of researchers regularly met to 
discuss and reflect on the results so far, to achieve a maximum degree of inter-
pretive validity (MEISSNER, 2007). Finally, the criterion of reliability was 
maintained by use of the aforementioned structuring technique, which was 
completed in two stages. In the first stage, the concepts were supplemented by 
the statements made by the interviewees. Through ordinal classification, the 
research team could then check whether or not the concepts in themselves were 
conclusive, based on the network of relationships established in the first phase. 
In the following section, we will describe our findings from the case study 
as an illustration of the research framework. Later, we will reflect on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methodological mix. 
3. The TELE Case: An Enterprise from the Swiss 
Telecommunications Industry  
It is clear that innovation practices can be described and analyzed from multi-
ple perspectives. For this illustrative case description, we apply the research 
framework and distinguish three basic views: context analysis, process descrip-
tion, and culture description. The analysis ends with the drawing of some con-
clusions. 
3.1 Context Analysis  
The case study was completed in conjunction with a major enterprise within the 
telecommunications industry in Switzerland. For decades the telecommunica-
tions industry in Switzerland has been a controlled monopoly market. With the 
revision of the Communications Law in 1998, the market in Switzerland – and 
in the EU – was liberalized. One of the reasons for this governmental change 
was the hope of various economic advantages to be realized. The legislature 
estimated that as a result telecommunication costs would be lowered and an 
additional wave of innovation would be spawned (ABEGG, 2005, p.76). Evi-
dence shows that these goals were not too audacious and have indeed been met. 
With this liberalization, a number of telecommunications firms have entered 
the market. Since then, a number of better-priced, high quality products and 
services have become available (VATERLAUS, BÜHLER, TELSER & ZEN-
HÄUSERN, 2004, p.10). 
The worldwide telecommunications market is characterized by very fast-
paced technological growth. The dynamics of this market is further character-
ized by the technological convergence of the technologies of telecommunica-
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tion, data communication and television. Today’s telecommunications compa-
nies are offering a new mix of services to their customers which are increas-
ingly being tailored to specific customer needs, usually in the form of a bundle 
of services. So it is not surprising that according to a study conducted by the 
University of Zurich in 2004, there still prevails a lot of above-average innova-
tion activity still prevails (VATERLAUS et al., 2004, p.10). 
Figure 3: Reconstruction of the TELE Innovation Process. 
 
TELE is a subsidiary of a large foreign telecommunications company, but 
which operates more or less autonomously with respect to its daily business 
operations/ decisions. For innovation projects in particular, TELE has its own 
allocated budget to develop new products and services. TELE has approxi-
mately 1,000 employees within Switzerland, distributed between several loca-
tions around the country. 
Until now, TELE has worked more or less in only one business segment ful-
filling the needs of both business and private customers. The percentage share 
of the company’s entire business volume for business customers amounts to a 
mere ten percent. This has a significant impact on the budget allocation for 
these two business units. Our study, therefore, observes innovation in a busi-
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ness unit which receives only a small portion of the entire corporate budget 
compared with the private customer unit. 
Based on the data collected, the innovation process could be reconstructed 
in detail and typical dynamics could be identified, which are shown in Figure 3.  
3.2 Process Description  
The upper half of the diagram in Figure 3 shows the different steps of the ob-
served innovation process. The impetus for the development of the new product 
in this case came from an external source as the project arose from a conversa-
tion with an important customer. The customer told a segment manager at 
TELE that he would be interested in a new telecommunications solution, be-
cause the old one was too expensive. Based on the criteria set by the customer, 
an internal proposal was created. 
After they overcame the first stage gate, a core team was assigned to handle 
the development of the product. Two important criteria inform the utilization of 
innovative teams. The first criterion is that team members be drawn from a 
range of different and functionally important departments from across the or-
ganization. And secondly that, like the innovation project manager stated it:  
For an optimal use of know-how, it is also important, that the people from the 
different departments are part of the team from the beginning. [...] (innovation 
project manager)  
If you don’t have people that understand the business, and know how to use 
internal knowledge you don’t succeed. (marketing manager) 
However, in the project team we observed, both these criteria were not met. For 
example, the marketing communication department should have become in-
volved in the project much earlier than they were. As a result, the influence of 
this department was minor, and the know-how was not used in an optimal way. 
The reason for this late involvement lies in the internal process schema. During 
the whole development process there were several stage gates to overcome. 
According to this internal process scheme, the marketing communication de-
partment does not get involved from the beginning. Possible influences and 
improvements from this department’s perspective were therefore not possible. 
One member of the marketing communication department states:  
To some extent there are certain process cycles and milestones, and the mar-
keting communication department becomes involved at a much later point in 
time. [Also] we are not involved from the beginning of the project, and there-
fore, our input is rather limited. [Additionally], the project has been protracted 
over many years now, and yes, well, the influence that I have had on the pro-
ject itself, is almost nonexistent. This is because this is the way the project 
was designed from the beginning. (marketing communication manager) 
Also noteworthy is the fact that TELE experienced several staff changes during 
the life of the project. These changes were made both to the development team, 
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and at the management level. This lack of staff continuity was assessed by 
various stakeholders of the project as being problematic.  
Change is another problem if you spend two hours explaining [how things 
work] to a guy, and then six months later he’s gone, and there’s a new guy. 
(marketing manager) 
In a broader sense, the customers are also a part of the development team. 
Before the launch of the product, there was a phase of customer acceptance 
tests. This step can be regarded as a trial-run, where the products were tested 
and improved. 
During the development phase, TELE worked together with an external 
partner (a supplier of technology) thereby, saving much time and money by 
obviating the need to develop these skills/competencies internally.  
External partners are really important when considering the time-to-market 
aspect of things, as we don’t have to build up all the knowledge and technol-
ogy, which the partner already has. Instead, we merely have to integrate it, 
which first of all gives us a major head start on the project. Alongside the time 
saved, we also receive the external partner’s services, which bundled together 
result in an interesting package. (partner manager) 
Collaboration with an external partner brings with it not just advantages, but 
also inherent dangers. One example is when the external partner becomes so 
crucial that he is indispensable in the future. Problems can occur due to techni-
cal barriers, or if the levels of skills promised are not made available, as de-
scribed in principal-agent theory (JENSENS & MECKLING, 1976). This is 
precisely what happened to TELE with the result that the original partner had 
to be changed because they did not have the desired know-how to finish the 
job. This change cost TELE much time and money although the new partner 
was quick and competent. 
3.3 Culture Description  
Based on the data, three prominent cultural influence factors could be identi-
fied: formal power, aversion to experiments, and transactional relationships. 
These will now be described in detail 
3.3.1 Formal Power  
The analysis of the process has shown that formal power is the most important 
factor during the whole process. Without the top management acceptance, 
innovations are doomed to fail from the beginning, as it is the board of direc-
tors that holds the responsibility for the allocation of resources.  
Without the support of top-management, innovations don’t have any chance in 
our company, which is true, we have, we need to, we have to tell them this is 
something that we really need, and we have to convince them what is the be-
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nefit of this, because when they are not convinced, your project will just be 
put on the side. (telecommunication engineer) 
Formal power in TELE is devolved, with only one authority, organizationally 
linked to top management, deciding which innovation projects will be carried 
out. This situation, whereby power is highly concentrated with a few individu-
als, is a decisive influence on innovation processes in TELE. According to the 
people involved the most difficult part was not the product development proc-
ess itself, but the difficult task of persuading and assuring senior management 
that the innovation was of strategically “fit” for the company.  
Because the technical part is not the difficult part, it is the, I guess the process 
part which has taken us the longest. (telecommunication engineer) 
However, once senior management pledged its commitment it provided signifi-
cant momentum to the entire success of the project. 
3.3.2 Aversion to Experiments  
The innovation project also included the development of a new business seg-
ment, or strategic business unit (SBU). Although senior management were 
totally supportive of this development, it was received with a good deal of 
resistance by the employees who would be most affected by any changes. As a 
first step, it was essential to gain the acceptance from these employees that the 
creation of this SBU represented the dawn of a new era in the company. Three 
members of the project team were given the task of pushing the product devel-
opment process to a successful completion. According to the people inter-
viewed, this is another prerequisite for the successful completion of innovation 
projects.  
[...] that two flag bearers were needed to bring the project forward. (depart-
ment manager) 
As previously mentioned, the customer is also a part of the wider development 
team. He is also very influential in winning over management support. If there 
is internal opposition against the new product idea, the customer, or rather the 
customer need, is a very strong argument to push it through the stage gates. 
This strategy is often used by the employees of TELE. One project member 
states:  
The customer was for me the steamroller/inspiration for me to go ahead in 
these times. The customer wanted this [product] and was really interested, and 
wanted to buy thousands of units as soon as the solution became operational. 
This appeal for the product was immediately internalized and transferred to 
the marketing segment. (department manager) 
Reservations about the new product were not only limited to the senior man-
agement with the sales department also expressing resistance. An important 
factor in gaining the support of the sales team was the running of regular prod-
uct training sessions to increase their understanding of the product’s features. 
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Without this knowledge the sales team would simply not attempt to sell the 
product – a form of passive resistance.  
We have regular sales training, and we also have an internal sales training de-
partment. In conjunction with the marketing manager, the sales training is se-
tup and the sales team is instructed to focus on the benefits and the key fac-
tors, so that they are communicated in the best possible way to the customer. 
(pre sales manager) 
For the salespeople, selling the new product must also be worthwhile in a fi-
nancial sense. Therefore, giving them the proper incentive to sell the product is 
also a consideration.  
On the one hand, you can have a really great product, but if you don’t properly 
motivate your sales staff by giving them the proper incentives to sell the prod-
uct, then they simply won’t sell it! They will only sell something that will pay 
off for them. In the implementation phase, these kinds of things are crucial. 
You have to think these things through before-hand, otherwise they just won’t 
work. If there is some sort of a hindrance then it won’t work. (department 
manager) 
Unsurprisingly, the people in the development circle were not resistant to the 
development of the new product. They were very motivated to get away from 
only the one-segment business model which the company had been focusing 
on. The certainty of entering new terrain seemed to be a positive thing.  
And the employees, here at TELE are actually really motivated, and also wan-
ted to, so to say, get away from only working in business segment X. (solu-
tions consultant) 
3.3.3 Transactional Relationships  
As mentioned earlier, the idea for the innovation was not an internal one, but 
rather an idea from a customer. During the whole process, the customer had an 
important role as a supplier of ideas, by providing arguments for the implemen-
tation of the project.  
I am also even talking to customers, so I am actually also implementing part 
of the functionality, and then they give me input, and I am also discussing 
with different vendors to get ideas on innovation. (product manager) 
Even though the customer is an important part, they are not systematically 
managed. The relationships are more informal, and dealt with by personal 
contact of the various sales people involved. 
For the development, TELE worked together with an external partner. The 
relationship with this partner is not considered to be very strong, so there is no 
interest in building a long-term relationship. The relationship is more results-
oriented, in the sense that they are merely a supplier of know-how, which 
TELE lacked, and which thereby helped them reduce their time-to-market for 
the product.  
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External partners are important. If we don’t have the capability to [complete 
the job] ... the external partners are important for the technologies we don’t 
[yet] have.  
I: Ok this is the only reason?  
B: If it was for me, I’m not going to be using an external partner because this 
is something that you don’t control, I am a control freak, I would want to 
know what happens, and you are always, external partners, unfortunately are 
there if you don’t have the capability to do it, and then but there is also the 
problem, that depending on the partners, product might be ok, product might 
not be ok. (telecommunication engineer) 
Within the core team, a very strong identification with the new product takes 
place. According to the interviewed people, this was a significant factor within 
the undertaking, which allowed the development process to be concluded suc-
cessfully.  
But then, for us, we are quite happy that we finally have this product, so that 
we will have something to offer, [that is] new to our clients, we really believe 
strongly in the product, and we hope that it will fly sooner or later. (telecom-
munication engineer) 
3.3.4 Conclusions from the TELE Case  
In summary, it is striking that a development process in TELE was character-
ized by skepticism and formal power. Innovative people need to have not only 
creative abilities, but also diplomacy and sales skills. As a first step, an innova-
tor needs to persuade the management board of his idea. This is the most im-
portant step in the whole process because the management board has the au-
thority to approve or deny any undertaking the firm is involved in and, thereby, 
also sets the budget for it. Thereafter an innovator must provide the sales team 
with a thorough understanding of the product’s benefits, so that they may in 
turn sell the product in the most effective way to the customer. While carrying 
out the project, it is important that the innovator push the development in the 
right direction. A manager has to be a visionary, a team leader, and a politician, 
all at the same time. 
4. Discussion  
The findings from the TELE case confirm many of those discussed earlier (see 
Shona BROWN and Kathleen EISENHARDT (1995). Most of the factors 
mentioned in their model were found in the innovation process at TELE (e.g. 
management support and the power of the project leader). The element missing 
from their model was the incorporation of “corporate culture.” As we have 
shown, the “aversion to experiments” – a cultural issue – had a strong influence 
on the whole process which can be observed from the resistance against the 
new product. Further important issues were the “power culture,” which made 
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the whole process unnecessarily prolonged and more complicated, and the 
transactional relationship nature of the partnership with the technology sup-
plier. This demonstrated that throughout the whole process, there was little 
interest in building long-term relationships as the culture in TELE was very 
goal oriented. 
While there appears to be an emerging realization in the management theory 
literature regarding hybrid forms of inter-firm innovation (e.g. ALMIRALL & 
CASADESUS-MASANELL, 2010), management education seems to be se-
verely lagging behind. An internet search for the term “dynamic innovation 
management role models” (and others similar to this) offered no helpful infor-
mation for research and practice. This discovery provides the empirical finding 
of our research. Thus we recommend that future studies concentrate on apply-
ing the academic theories outlined in this paper with the aim of transforming 
management practice. Obviously, this is an ambitious aim, but we see no other 
possibility to adequately appreciate the skilful practice of innovation manage-
ment which we observed at TELE. These practices brought together artful and 
mindful combinations of interdisciplinary management skills which enabled 
innovation to proceed in spite of the powerful internal barriers that the com-
pany tried to set up. 
In reference to the methodology, we consider the multi-method mix to have 
been an appropriate tool to identify and uncover the diverse interrelations and 
dynamics within the case study. Significant value was gained by the problem-
centered interviews due to their multifaceted function. They served as a lens for 
examining the innovation practices/dynamics, as well as an instrument to 
gather a process description through the eyes of the real-life participants. By 
combining the findings from the different methods it was possible to recon-
struct the TELE innovation process with the cultural themes as shown in Figure 
3. However, some basic problems remain, the main ones being as follows: 
Firstly, mixing methods meant producing increasing amounts of data. Dur-
ing the ongoing research process, a main challenge was to maintain a specific 
order and logic to our data. On the one hand, specific findings (for example 
from the contextual analysis) had to be compared with other findings (for ex-
ample from the problem-centered interviews) for triangulation purposes. On the 
other hand, there was a need to maintain a natural interpretive flexibility to 
advance in the research. 
A second problem was encountered when trying to weight the different 
methods equally. In our case, the problem-centered interview was considered to 
be the primary tool. However, whilst the structural analysis helped us get a 
better impression of the problem, it mainly served to validate the interview 
findings. We consider that the research design meant that the structural analysis 
remained regrettably under-used, as it could have served a better and more 
influential purpose overall. However, the question of arranging and prioritizing 
the different methods has been in discussion in multi-method research for a 
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long time. And academic discussions further show that this problem cannot be 
solved without taking the respective research context into account. In the TELE 
case, it made sense to stick to the problem-centered interviews and to validate 
and enrich the findings with the results of both of the other analyses. 
Thirdly, the mixed method approach took a lot of time. The research team 
spent over a year, from the beginning of the context analysis to the final inter-
pretive steps of the dissemination of results. By the time the researchers were 
ready to present their feedback and central results to the participants, the whole 
company context had changed. Due to a strategic calculation, two competitors 
announced a merger, mixing up the market conditions of the relatively small 
Swiss market. Thus all current management activities were put under scrutiny. 
Furthermore by that time, a key stakeholder was no longer around, thus limit-
ing the application of our research at TELE and the potential for continuous 
improvement of practices. Therefore, through the combination of changing 
industry-specific factors together with the cumbersome nature of our research 
design, the hoped-for effects from our research were much reduced. This was 
the first time that the research team had experienced such an unsynchronized 
pattern of events. The challenge now is to identify an adequate context for 
validating the entire research process. 
In summary, our research comprised an effective mix of methods that re-
main open for improvement in future projects. The basic problems of multi-
method research, like the immense growth of processable data and empirical 
information, remain, as does the question of how to weigh and prioritize the 
methods used. As an applied social science project this research into innovation 
management is intrinsically limited by its subjective perspective and interpre-
tive angle. A further validation of the whole research process by practitioners is 
necessary therefore to ensure the validity of our findings, but not the value of 
the research framework itself. 
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